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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY 




CARNICERO DYNASTY CORPORATION, 
a corporation; WENDELL L. 
BUTCHER; IRENE B. BUTCHER; 
CHRIS L. STANFIELD; JANIS B. 
STANFIELD; BEN D. ISAAC; and 
LILA 0. ISAAC, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 13836 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is a civil action brought by plaintiff against defend-
ants to recover moneys paid under a construction bond pursuant to 
the terms of an indemnity agreement given by defendants Butcher. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to the court sitting without a jury, 
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, presiding. The 
trial court found the issues in favor of the plaintiff and against 
all defendants, and entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment accordingly. From said Judgment, defendants 
Butcher appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Judgment of the trial 
court entered herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In reciting the facts in appellants1 brief, they have 
abstracted testimony and drawn conclusions therefrom in a light 
most favorable to their position. The recitation of facts by 
respondent will be in conformity with this Court!s pronouncement 
in the case of Cheney vs. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 381 P.2d 86, 
wherein the Court stated: 
11
 In considering the soundness of the trial 
courtfs conclusion and judgment..., cer-
tain cardinal rules must be kept in mind: 
That the judgment is endowed with a pre-
sumption of validity; that the party 
attacking it has the burden of affirma-
tively showing that it is in error; and 
that the evidence and all the inferences 
that fairly and reasonably may be drawn 
therefrom must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to it.11 
Wendell Butcher and his wife are the only defendants 
appealing herein. The remaining defendants, against whom judg-
ment was entered, have allowed respondents judgment to become 
final. 
Appellant, Wendell Butcher, was the managing director 
of the Carnicero (Butcher in Spanish) Dynasty Corporation. 
The officers in the corporation and principal stockholders were 
his children (R-271). Wendell Butcher ran the corporation as 
its managing director. Such a description of his position is 
given for lack of a better terminology. He admittedly was the 
only one to really know what was going on in the company and 
was operating the company as he saw fit, the stock ownership 
however being in the names of his children. 
A bond was needed before Carnicero could bid on the con-
struction of a post office in Farmington, Utah. Butcher 
approached an insurance agent, Joseph Mills, and requested a 
bid bond on the project, explaining that in the event the bid 
was accepted, he would need a Labor, Materials and Performance 
Bond as well. He was the only person to ever contact the in-
surance agent concerning the bond (R-370). He was told by the 
agent that since the corporation was a new company and of 
questionable financial position, indemnity would be required 
from Butcher and the officers (R-361). 
The trial judge questioned the agent concerning the 
proposal of indemnity as follows: 
"The Court: And after the corporation got 
the bid, what steps were taken to get the 
bond issued? 
"The Witness: When he notified us that he 
got the bid, we notified General Insurance 
Company in Denver, and they issued me to 
issue the performance, labor and material 
bond. 
"The Court: What, if anything, was done with 
respect to the indemnity agreement? 
"The Witness: When that was signed and turned 
in to me, I sent it in to the company office 
in Denver. 
"The Court: Did you request that agreement? 
"The Witness: No, sir, the company did. 
"The Court: Do you know the means by which the 
company requested that agreement? 
"The Witness: They request it on all bonds. 
"The Court: How is that request transferred 
to the applicant for the bond? 
"The Witness: Through me. I requested it from 
Mr. Butcher. 
"The Court: Well, that was my question. Did 
you request the indemnity agreement? 
"The Witness: After the company asked me to do 
it, yes. 
"The Court: Was that before the bond was issued? 
"The Witness: Yes, sir." (R.375-376) (Emphasis 
ours.) 
Butcher, in negotiating with the insurance agent concern-
ing the bond, admitted that he was told by the agent that before 
any bond could be issued on any of their jobs they might be 
bidding on, he would have to submit financial statements and 
indemnity agreements to the company. He testified as follows: 
ffQo (by Mr. Walker). Let me ask you when 
-- on or about the time you took these 
indemnity agreements to the insurance 
company, although you didnft sign an 
application, did you discuss obtaining 
bonds on either of these jobs with the 
insurance company? 
,fA. With the Safeway or the Forest Service 
Building? 
flQ. Yes. 
ffA. Yes, I told Mr. Mills that that is what 
we was doing, that we were trying to get 
financing and we talked to -- where we 
presented it on our statement to him and 
told him we did not have permanent financ-
ing, that we possibly would need a completion 
bond on this. And so we might as well --
the company might as well submit what 
applications we needed for the bonds in 
case we needed bonds. 
,!Q. And did he instruct you to do anything 
but get this indemnity agreement? 
f,A. He said he would need an application which 
we signed at that time, I thought, and we 
would have to submit financial statements 
which we did and we would have to -- being 
it was a new corporation, we would have to 
sign indemnitor agreements which I went 
and had signed afterwards. 
f,Q. You say it was discussed with Mr. Mills at 
the time the indemnity agreement --
nA. I told him why we needed the bonds, yes.11 
(R0360-361). (Emphasis ours.) 
The agent, Joe Mills, testified that the company required 
indemnity agreements to be signed on all bonds issued and more 
particularly, from the individuals where their corporation was 
new and credit was questionable (R0375-376). 
Butcher presented the indemnity agreements to his own 
children and their respective spouses for signature and returned 
them to the insurance agent, Mills. In the meantime, the agent 
had prepared and delivered to Butcher the bonds requested, dat-
ing said bonds in conformity to the date of the contract with 
the United States Government for the building of the post office. 
The bonds were prepared by the insurance company on bond forms 
provided by the United States Government and as required under 
the contract. The forms were not insurance company forms but 
were U. S. Government forms, merely signed by the bonding 
company and the contractor. 
After approximately four months had elapsed and no in-
demnity agreement had been signed by Wendell Butcher or Irene 
Butcher, the company requested the agent to again contact 
Mr. Butcher and request that he sign and furnish it the indem-
nity agreement previously agreed upon. Upon receiving this 
request, Butcher then responded as promised and delivered the 
signed indemnity agreement to the company after having the 
same notarized. Approximately one year thereafter, notice of 
losses began appearing on the scene. Claims of unpaid 
creditors were being forwarded to the bonding company for pay-
ment. 
The insurance carrier contacted Butcher and his children 
concerning their obligations and requested that they clear up 
the outstanding debts if possible. Upon receiving no financial 
assurances from the defendants, the bonding company was then 
required to meet with all the creditors and make arrangements 
to satisfy their claims to remove liens from the building so 
that the post office could commence its operations. 
Suit was thereafter filed claiming payment under the 
indemnity agreements. In answering the pleadings, all but 
defendants Isaac admitted the allegations of consideration for 
the indemnity agreement. In paragraph 2 of plaintifffs com-
plaint, it alleged as follows: 
"That the defendants, and each of them, 
applied to and received a Labor and 
Materials Payment Bond and Performance 
Bond Numbers 573306 from the plaintiff 
insurance company ..." 
And thereafter in paragraph 4 of said complaint, it stated: 
"That the defendants, and each of them, in 
consideration for the issuance of said 
bonds, executed a General Agreement of 
Indemnity indemnifying the plaintiff here-
in for any and all loss that it might 
suffer as the result of its issuing said 
bonds." 
In response to the above allegations in the complaint, 
defendants Isaac denied the same. As soon as receiving that 
answer, counsel for respondent herein immediately deposed the 
Isaacs wherein they admitted the truthfulness of the allega-
tions and that they had, in fact, signed the indemnity agreement 
laying the issue to rest at that point. 
In answering the complaint on behalf of the Butchers, 
the answer failed to deny any of the allegations to plaintifffs 
complaint other than as stated in defendants Butchers1 answer 
which set forth four defenses as follows: 
"1. That plaintiff failed to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted; 
fl2o That the plaintiff was not the real 
party in interest; 
"3. That plaintifffs action was premature; 
and 
fl4. Disputed claims to creditors who were 
not entitled to payment and would become 
a volunteer.11 
No other defenses were raised by the Butchers nor did they 
deny the allegations of plaintifffs complaint and more specifically, 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of said complaint (R.8-9). Shortly thereafter, 
defendants amended their answer to exclude as an answering party 
the defendants Isaac but again reiterated the same defenses con~ 
tained in the original answer (R-10). 
About four or five months prior to the trial of the 
case, defendants Butcher requested copies of the document in 
question, namely, the Indemnity Agreement they had signed, 
which were furnished to them. Although the document bore a 
date clearly visible on its face, and Wendell Butcher was 
fully aware of the time when the bond was issued as he signed 
the contract and bond on behalf of the corporation, there was 
nevertheless no motion to amend these defendants1 answer to 
allege a defense of lack of consideration nor was any ever 
claimed. It was not until after respondent rested its case 
that appellants Butcher attempted to then amend their pleadings 
to include a defense of lack of consideration. 
The apparent difference in the time or dates, as indi-
cated on the Indemnity Agreement of the Butchers, as compared 
to the bonds came about because of the late signing of the 
agreement by the Butchers although they had previously agreed 
to give such indemnification. 
Considerable argument is made by appellants herein (its 
materiality on the issues however is unknown) that there were 
several continuances in the trial of the matter which were sole 
the responsibility of respondent. It is respectfully pointed 
Q 
out that the last continuance of the trial setting in the 
matter was granted by Judge Ernest F. Baldwin at the request 
of counsel for defendants Butcher. He contacted counsel for 
the plaintiff and indicated that a continuance was desired. 
At that point, counsel for plaintiff was requested to confer 
with the Judge, indicating a lack of objection for a contin-
uance and requesting the court to do so at the request of 
Mr. Barker. Since plaintiff had received a continuance from 
Mr. Barker with the courtfs consent, it was felt that plain-
tiff was obligated to give consent. In any event, a continuance 
of the last trial setting was given by Judge Baldwin only after 
insisting that Mr. Ronald Barker, counsel for the Butchers, con-
tact Judge Baldwin personally and make the request directly 
rather than by counsel for plaintiff. Apparently, this was 
done and Judge Baldwin granted the continuance. 
After all the evidence had been presented to the court 
by respondent, the matter was taken under advisement, including 
defendants Butchers1 motion to amended their pleadings. There-
after the court ruled in favor of the respondent herein, finding 
that appellants Butcher had, in fact, signed their Indemnity 
Agreement in consideration for the respondent issuing its bond$ 
and that respondent, in reliance upon their promise to do so, 
issued the bonds although the Agreement of Indemnity had not 
actually been signed until after the bonds had been delivered. 
The court further found that the damages, as alleged by the 
respondent, had been proven and awarded judgment accordingly 
(R. 150 through 155). From said Judgment, the Butchers take 
this appealo 
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS BUTCHER ARE LEGALLY BOUND TO INDEMNIFY THE RESPONDENT 
AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS BUTCHER FAILED TO RAISE THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF CON-




APPELLANTS BUTCHER ARE LEGALLY BOUND TO INDEMNIFY THE RESPONDENT 
AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Butchers were told that before any bond could be 
issued on the post office job, indemnity would be required from 
all concerned. Wendell Butcher presented the agreements to his 
family for signature. He returned those signed by his children 
and their spouses but delayed in signing one himself. The bonds 
in the meantime were issued by the company to conform to the 
contract date and were delivered subject to his promise to give 
the required indemnity. He was told of the need for the indem-
nity agreement prior to the bonds being issued and had agreed 
to supply the same. About four months after the bonds had been 
delivered, the bonding company then, through its agent, insisted 
that Mr. and Mrs. Butcher complete their agreement by signing 
the indemnification and returning it to the company. This was 
done by the Butchers without objection. About one year later, 
the project became bogged down in unpaid bills and the bonding 
company was required to take over and complete the job, includ-
ing payment of the unpaid bills. 
At the conclusion of the respondents evidence, the 
Butchers attempted to amend their pleadings by alleging lack 
of consideration because of the variance in dates on the instru-
ments. The trial court refused to allow them to do so and 
specifically found that the Butchers had promised, with the 
others, to give indemnification for the issuance of the bonds 
and although they did not actually sign their agreement until 
after the bonds had actually been delivered, such late signing 
did not invalidate their agreement. The court further found 
that there was consideration given by the insurance carrier 
for issuing said bonds and that the Butchers promised to indem-
nify if the bonds were to issue. 
The court chose to believe the testimony of the agent 
that indemnification was requested prior to the issuance of 
the bonds. 
An indemnity agreement signed after the execution and 
delivery of the bond has the same force and effect as if it 
were executed at the time the bonds were issued if there was 
an understanding between the parties. Where the indemnitee 
and the indemnitor agree that indemnity will issue if the 
company provides its bond, such agreement is binding. See 
Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland vs. 0'Bryan et al 
(Kentucky), 180 Ky. 277, 202 S.W.645. In the O'Bryan case, 
the defendants agreed to provide indemnity in the event a 
bond was issued. However, the indemnity agreement was not 
signed until sometime after the bond had been issued. The 
Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in what appears to be the lead-
ing case on the subject, stated: 
nWe, therefore, have no difficulty in ruling 
that the bond of indemnity was executed si-
multaneously with the bond of the surety 
company, or at any rate that the bond of 
indemnity, although it may not have been 
finally executed and delivered until April, 
1904 (several months later), was then fully 
executed and delivered pursuant to an agree-
ment, made before or at the time the bond 
was made by the surety company, that the 
13 
bond of indemnity would be executed. It 
is immaterial which of these view is 
correct because if the bond of indemnity 
was executed and delivered simultaneously 
with the bond of the surety company, or 
was afterwards executed and delivered pur-
suant to an agreement or arrangement made 
between the surety company and the indemni-
tors before or at the time it signed 
Blackwell's bond, there was sufficient 
consideration for the execution of the bond 
of indemnity. In other words, the execution 
of a bond of indemnity subsequent to the 
execution of the original undertaking will 
have the same force and effect as if it were 
executed simultaneously with the original 
undertaking, if its subsequent execution was 
pursuant to an arrangement or agreement, 
between the indemnitee and the indemnitors, 
at the time or before the indemnitee' became 
bound, that there should be executed to it 
a bond of indemnity." (Emphasis ours.) 
See also 50 AmJur, Suretyship, Section 19, Page 914. 
Therein, the author states: 
"If the original contract is induced by the 
promise of one of the parties that he will 
obtain the signature of the person who sub-
sequently signs a surety in pursuance of 
such agreement, no new consideration is 
necessary to support the latter1s undertak-
ing. In such case, the execution of the 
instrument by the surety relates back to 
and takes effect the same as if it had been 
coincidental with the execution by the origi-
nal debtor. Often the language of the 
decision is broad enough to make a promise 
by the principal to procure any signer in 
general, rather than some particular signer, 
sufficient to remove the case from the 
operation of the general rule and, of course, 
no new consideration is necessary if the 
signer signs in pursuance of his own 
previous promise to do so." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
Other more recent cases following the 0'Bryan case main-
tain the same sound positionQ See the case of Wagner vs. 
Fireman1s Fund Insurance Company (Colorado), CCA 10th, 1965, 
352 Fedo2d 410. In the Wagner case, the indemnity agreement 
was not signed and delivered until at least two months after the 
bonds were delivered. The Court stated: 
"The basis of liability for the judgment 
against all of the appellants is an in-
demnity agreement which was furnished to 
the surety company. This agreement was 
not executed and delivered until at least 
two months after the bonds had been 
delivered. The primary defense was lack 
of consideration in that the instrument 
was not a part of the original transaction 
and was not an inducement for the issuance 
of the bonds0fl 
The Court then stated that it was the finding of the trial 
court that the defendants agreed, when they applied for the bond, 
that they would issue indemnity agreements in consideration for 
the company providing the bonds. The Appellate Court thereafter 
stated: 
"The rule is well stated in Fidelity & 
Deposit Company of Maryland vs. O'Bryan, 
180 Ky. 277 .... the execution of a bond 
of indemnity subsequent to the execution 
of the original undertaking will have the 
same force and effect as if it were exe-
cuted simultaneously with the original 
undertaking, if its subsequent execution 
was pursuant to an arrangement or agree-
ment, between the indemnitee and indemnitors, 
at the time or before the indemnitee became 
bound, that there should be executed to it 
a bond of indemnity.ff 
The Circuit Court further stated: 
"The evidence is adequate to support the 
findings that the indemnity agreement was 
contemplated by the original undertaking 
and did not require new consideration.11 
See also the case of Engbrock vs. Federal Insurance 
Company (Texas 1967), CCA 5th, 370 Fed.2d 784. In the Engbrock 
case, the indemnity agreement was not signed and delivered to 
the surety for over four months after the bonds were issued. 
The Fifth Circuit Court stated: 
,fIn the trial against Engbrock, as an individ-
ual, a question was raised in regard to an 
agreement under which Engbrock was to indem-
nify surety for losses sustained under bonds 
issued to Encon on the Eagle Lake job. 
Engbrock contends that the indemnity agree-
ment fails for lack of consideration because 
he signed the agreement four months after 
the bond had been issued. The trial judge 
recognized this contention would have force 
if the signing of the agreement had consti-
tuted a new promise by Engbrock. But, to 
the contrary, the judge found that prior to 
the execution of the bonds in May, 1962, 
Engbrock had promised orally to execute the 
indemnity agreement before or contemporan-
eously with the execution of the bonds. 
This finding is supported by ample evidence 
.... In such circumstances, the execution 
of the indemnity agreement is in pursuance 
and consummation of a prior arrangement 
between the parties and it is not necessary 
that the written promise carrying into effect 
the prior oral promise to execute the writing 
be supported by new or additional considera-
tion.11 
See also an annotation on the subject at 167 ALR 1203, 
wherein the author states: 
"Where antecedent promises to execute a 
collateral or supplemental undertaking with 
respect to a principal contract is made 
directly by the one who becomes the under-
taker, as an inducement to the execution 
thereof, it is sufficient to supply the 
necessary legal consideration for the 
undertaking, in whatever form the promise 
may be evidenced.11 
The evidence is clear that by the testimony of the agent 
and appellants Butcher, indemnity was to be required of Butcher 
and the other persons involved with the corporation because of 
the fact that the corporation was new and lacked financial 
stability. Based upon Butcher1s promise of indemnity, together 
with the other defendants herein, the bonds were issued. The 
court so found and entered judgment accordingly. Had the Butchers 
not intended to give indemnity for the issuance of said bonds, 
they should have so stated upon applying for the bonds. Had they 
done so, undoubtedly, the bonds would have been rejected 
because of the instability of the company making application. 
Instead, the opposite occurred. They not only understood that 
they were required to give indemnity but Mr. Butcher obtained 
the signatures of the other parties himself and he later on 
also signed an indemnity agreement without objection. Undoubtedly, 
the agent was tardy in not following up the signing of the 
Butcher indemnity agreement at an earlier date but such did 
not invalidate the intent of the parties or their agreements. 
The courtfs findings are amply supported by the evidence and 
should not be disturbed. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS BUTCHER FAILED TO RAISE THE DEFENSE OF LACK OF CON-
SIDERATION IN THEIR ANSWER AND SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM NOW SO 
DOING. 
Lack of consideration, being an affirmative defense, should 
have been pleaded in the initial answer which was not done (Rule 8c, 
U.R.C.P.). Had Mr. and Mrs. Butcher honestly believed that there 
was no agreement in advance of the issuance of the bonds to give 
indemnification, they certainly would have informed their coun-
sel of such information and would have refused to give indemnity 
when so requested. The court found from the evidence that 
the various information concerning the date of the bonds 
-I Q 
and the date of the Butcher indemnity agreement was available 
to them months before the matter came to trial. In spite of 
this, however, no such defense was ever raised. Wendell 
Butcher signed the contractual paper and the bond that was 
prepared by the Government and therefore, had to have been 
aware of the date of its execution. He also knew that when 
he finally got around to signing his own indemnity agreement, 
several months had elapsed since the bond had been issued. 
If it were not his intent to give indemnity in consideration 
for the issuance of said bonds, he certainly was obligated to 
raise such an objection rather than sign. The court so found. 
The court further found by the evidence, as testified to by 
Mr. Mills and by Mr. Butcher, that indemnification was discussed 
and was a prerequisite before the company would issue its bond 
to this newly activated and apparently somewhat financially 
unstable corporation. The facts clearly indicate that both 
Mr. Mills so testified as did Mr. Butcher. 
Had it been the intention to raise such a defense, the 
same should have been done when it was raised by defendants Isaac. 
When they denied the indemnification agreement, immediate dis-
covery was commenced. After seeing their indemnity agreement 
and having their memories refreshed, the Isaacs then admitted 
signing the agreement. This issue was then put to rest immed-
iately. It was obvious that the Butchers executed the agreement 
of indemnity as orally agreed upon. 
Nevertheless, the Butchers requested the court to allow 
an amendment of the pleadings at the conclusion of the respondent's 
evidence and at a time when it was virtually impossible for the 
respondent to have rebutted said evidence as it had not been an 
issue in the case until that time and there was no way witnesses 
could be made available. This court correctly stated the 
general principles in the case of Goeltz vs. Continental Bank & 
Trust Company, 5 Utah 2d 204, 299 P.2d 832. In this case, it 
was claimed by the defendant that a motion to amend its answer 
to include the defense of the Statute of Limitations should be 
allowed. The Court stated: 
"Here defendant seeks leave to amend after all 
the evidence is in, even though all of the 
facts on which this defense is based have been 
fully known by the bank since the original 
certificates were deposited with it in March 
of 1947 and no new evidence was discovered 
during the trial which made the defense avail-
able where it had not been available under the 
facts known by the bank in the first instances." 
The Court then properly ruled that such an amendment should not 
be permitted. 
In the instant case, the insurance agent, Joe Mills, 
testified that at this late date, he could not recollect all 
of the details as to the documentation of the file by 
correspondence, etc. as he did not have the facilities to keep 
records for such a period of time. It was also pointed out to 
the court that certain people involved in the Bonding Department 
of the respondent company were no longer employed by it and 
their whereabouts was unknown at the conclusion of the trial. 
This Court aptly presented the plaintifffs position in 
its commentaries in the case of Buehner Block Company vs. Glezos, 
6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P.2d 517. In interpreting the Rules of 
Civil Procedure bearing upon the right to amend pleadings, this 
Honorable Court stated: 
"Notwithstanding all of our efforts to elim-
inate technicalities and liberalize proced-
ure , we must not lose sight of the cardinal 
principle that under our system of justice, 
if an issue is to be tried and a partyfs 
rights concluded with respect thereto, he 
must have notice thereof and an opportunity 
to meet it." (Emphasis ours.) 
Respondent herein respectfully submits that the Court 
correctly concluded that the evidence clearly indicated that the 
bonding company asked for indemnification from the Butchers and 
other parties of the corporation as a prerequisite to its issuing 
its bonds. The record shows, as was found by the court, that 
Butcher, as did the other defendants, agreed to give this 
indemnification at the time the bonds were requested. 
Clearly, where a party fails to deny a material allega-
tion of a complaint and fails to plead an affirmative defense, 
it can only be interpreted by the court and the opposite party 
that such is not an issue in the case and treat it accordingly. 
No party to a law suit should be required to anticipate that 
its opponent will move to amend his pleadings after all of the 
evidence has been presented, allowing no opportunity to overcome 
the allegations contained within the proposed amendment at the 
conclusion of trial. It is respectfully submitted that the 
court properly so ruled. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants herein have failed to make an affirmative 
showing of error. The evidence, and all inferences that fairly 
and reasonably may be drawn therefrom, and viewed in a light 
most favorable to the respondent, support the court's Findings 
of Fact and Judgment herein and should not be disturbed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR 
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